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A SNEAK PREVIEW INTO How THE COURT TOOK AWAY A
STATE'S RIGHT TO EXECUTE SIXTEEN AND SEVENTEEN
YEAR OLD JUVENILES: THE THREAT OF EXECUTION WILL
No LONGER SAVE AN INNOCENT VICTIM'S LIFE
MITCHEL BRIMt
INTRODUCTION
Imagine your daughter, Elizabeth, fourteen years of age, and her
best friend, Jenny, sixteen years of age, after a long day at high school
decide to take a shortcut home down a railroad track through a park.
While walking through the park, they are attacked by five vicious ani-
mals.' All gang members. 2 Elizabeth was grabbed and taken down the
incline off the railroad tracks.3 Testimony revealed that Jenny became
free and could have run away but decided that she wanted to help her
best friend who was crying out for help.
4
For the next hour or so, there were never less than two males on one
female. The girls were repeatedly raped orally, vaginally, and anally.
5
One of the gang members bragged about how loose and sloppy one of
the girls was, and another bragged about having virgin blood on him.
Taking away these two innocent teenagers' self-esteem and inno-
cence by raping them for over an hour was not enough for these vicious
animals. These animals meticulously took Elizabeth and Jenny into an
isolated area of the woods. Two of them placed a belt around their necks
and pulled from each end until the belt broke.
After the belt broke, the killers used a shoelace to finish their job.
One of the killers complained that, "The bitch won't die and it would
have been easier to have used a gun."'6 After having her ribs kicked in
and her teeth knocked out, Elizabeth was strangled to death, after crying
and pleading for her life.
t Southwestern School of Law, J.D. Author of The Ultimate Solution to Properly Adminis-
ter the Ultimate Penalty, 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 275 (2003). Mr. Brim is also the sole author of the Brief
of Arnici Curiae on behalf of Justice for All Alliance in support of Petitioner in Roper v. Simmons.
Brief of Amici Curiae Justice for All Alliance, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-
633). The following is a transcript of remarks made on March 4, 2005 at the Denver University Law
Review Symposium, "Children and the Courts: Is Our System Truly Just?"





6. The Murders of Jennifer ErIman and Elizabeth Pena, at
http://www.murdervictims.comNVoices/jeneliz.html (last visited June 20,2005).
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Should the fate of these people who disrespected the dignity of
these two innocent girls be based on whether their actions were commit-
ted when they were sixteen, seventeen or one day before their eighteenth
birthday? How should the United States Supreme Court decide whether
states should be able to execute sixteen and seventeen year olds?
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This article will evaluate, analyze, and criticize how the United
States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons recently prohibited any state
from executing a sixteen or seventeen year old. 7 Instead of drawing a
categorical rule barring the imposition of capital punishment on anyone
under the age of eighteen, this article will establish that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment our forefathers
created, dictated that the Court adopt a standard that provides
states guidance to properly administer the ultimate punishment in a ra-
tional and consistent manner for the worst of the worst on a case by case
basis. Victims suffer daily knowing their loved one was brutally raped
and killed by people who intentionally, consciously and maliciously took
away their right to live in a democratic society. Victims now feel a sense
of injustice as a result of the United States Supreme Court in Roper v.
Simmons prohibiting states from executing anyone under the age of
eighteen. The reason victims feel a sense of injustice is because as a
society, we rely on the criminal justice system to ascertain the appropri-
ate punishment for a particular case and crime. We relied on the United
States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons to link the ultimate punish-
ment to those who are among the worst of the worst by upholding prece-
dent which requires individual consideration as a constitutional require-
ment before sentencing one to death.8 The Court ignored this precedent
and based its decision on erroneous assumptions about juveniles as a
class.9 By grouping all sixteen and seventeen year olds together as a
class, the Court disregarded and ignored the fact that the Respondent,
Christopher Simmons, was fully responsible for having committed a de-
liberate premeditated murder. Furthermore, the Court failed to acknowl-
edge the fact that juveniles are all different with respect to their experi-
ence, maturity, intelligence and moral culpability.
The Court created federal law protecting anyone under the age of
eighteen from capital punishment by utilizing an arbitrary standard it
created, but never defined, known as the "evolving standards of decency
doctrine." This enabled the individual justices of the United States Su-
preme Court to use their own morality and make a decision based on
their own prejudices and biases. Instead, the plurality should have em-
7. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
8. See Enund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
605 (1978)).
9. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
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braced the factors that are reflected through state legislation and defined
by the Court as what punishment amounts to cruel and unusual.
II. A CATEGORICAL RULE BASED ON AGE IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF
ONE'S MORAL CULPABILITY
The Court should not have drawn a bright line rule at the arbitrary
age of eighteen because age does not define one's character, judgment,
maturity, personal responsibility, or moral guilt. No one, including psy-
chiatrists, psychologists and brain specialists, dispute that some sixteen
and seventeen year olds are as mature or more mature than some of those
who are eighteen and older. United States Supreme Court Justices, even
the plurality in Roper v. Simmons, Nobel Peace Prize winners, the
American Medical Association and the European Union all agree. 10 In-
stead, the Court's new bright line of eighteen years of age "treats all per-
sons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass .... "11 Fur-
thermore, the Court's ruling treats sixteen and seventeen year olds as a
class of animals who are incapable of making a conscious decision or
who do not know or understand that it is wrong to kill someone. Such an
assertion is not in fact the case. The reasoning in Roper v. Simmons is
flawed because even though juveniles can be immature and impulsive at
times that does not mean that they can not be fully responsible or morally
culpable for having committed premeditated murder. Sixteen and seven-
teen year olds are certainly capable of understanding right from wrong
and the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, they are capable of
forming the requisite intent to kill to merit the death penalty. Moreover,
they are capable of being deterred from forming the requisite intent to
kill. All of these statements will be illustrated and supported by an
analysis of Roper v. Simmons.
In Roper v. Simmons, respondent possessed the requisite intent to
kill evidenced by his statements to his friends that he would "find some-
one to burglarize, tie the victim up, and ultimately push the victim off a
bridge., 12 Christopher Simmons meticulously and methodically planned
to kill Ms. Crook and in fact arranged for his friends to meet him at a
particular time and location to commit murder.' 3 Christopher Simmons
also deliberated over killing Ms. Crook when he burglarized her home,
taped her hands behind her back, taped her eyes and mouth shut, placed
her in the back of the minivan and drove her from her house in Jefferson
County to Castlewood State Park in St. Louis County. 14 Christopher
Simmons contemplated killing her as he proceeded to torture her. He
10. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1186.
11. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
12. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997).
13. Id. at 178.
14. Id. at 170.
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pulled her out of the van, restrained her hands and feet, covered her head
with a towel, hog-tied her hands and feet together with electrical cable,
and covered her face with electrical tape.15 He then deliberately pushed
her off of the railroad trestle into the river.16 His belief that his age
would allow him to "get away with" such a heinous act shows both a
reckless indifference to human life and knowledge of the consequences
of his actions.' 7 Yet, the plurality in Roper v. Simmons overlooked the
fact that Simmons possessed culpability qualifying him among the worst
of the worst deserving of execution by comparing general differences
between those under eighteen and adults and making a generalized
statement that "juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders."' 8 If the Court would have adopted the stan-
dard proposed in the Amici Curiae brief by Justice For All Alliance then
it would have been possible to determine with reliability which sixteen or
seventeen year olds are among the worst offenders meriting the death
penalty.
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT MANDATING
INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
BEFORE SENTENCING A JUVENILE TO DEATH DICTATES A CASE-BY-
CASE ANALYSIS RATHER THAN A BRIGHT LINE RULE
Respect for humanity by treating people as unique individuals is the
cornerstone underlying the Eighth Amendment. In fact, the Court and a
majority of state legislatures have held that individual consideration by
respecting humanity is a constitutional requirement before sentencing
one to death. 19 This requires consideration of an individual's character,
the record of the juvenile offender, and the circumstances of the particu-
lar offense.20 Yet, the Court in Simmons ignored this precedent by fail-
ing to base its decision on the facts and moral culpability of Christopher
Simmons.
The Court should have abided by this precedent and not have
grouped juveniles together as a class but rather recognized that each in-
dividual defendant is different with respect to his or her maturity, intelli-
gence, capability and moral guilt. The Court should have upheld Justice
O'Connor's ruling in Thompson v. Oklahoma,2' in which she stated:
[G]ranting the premise that adolescents are generally less blamewor-
thy than adults who commit similar crimes, it does not necessarily
15. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 170.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 169.
18. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1186.
19. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 309 (1976); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
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follow that all 15-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability that
would justify the imposition of capital punishment.
22
Juveniles as young as fifteen can form the requisite intent to kill and
are able to both understand the consequences of their actions and con-
form their conduct to civilized standards. This is clearly illustrated by
looking at the moral culpability of William Wayne Thompson, who was
fifteen when he committed the brutal murder of his brother-in-law,23 and
Christopher Simmons, who was seventeen when he committed a brutal,
premeditated murder.
24
In Thompson, the petitioner's heinous acts reveal his culpable men-
tal state. He shot his brother-in-law twice, cut his throat, chest and ab-
domen.25  He subsequently chained his body to a concrete block and
threw his body into the river so that "the fish could eat his body. 2 6 He
clearly knew that these atrocious acts were wrong and would end up tak-
ing the life of his innocent brother-in-law.
In Simmons, Christopher Simmons, at age seventeen, decided he
wanted to commit murder. In chilling, callous terms, he talked about his
27
plan, discussing it for the most part with his two friends. He planned to
commit burglary and murder by breaking and entering into a person's
home, tying up the victim, and throwing the victim off of a bridge.28
This is exactly what Christopher Simmons did, and before he did it, he
specifically told his friends that he "could get away with it," because of
his age.29
Using duct tape to cover the eyes and mouth of the victim, the two
perpetrators put Ms. Crook in her minivan and drove her to a state park.30
There, they walked her, with a towel over her head, to a railroad trestle
spanning the Meramec river.3' They tied her hands and feet with electri-
cal cable, bound her face completely with duct tape and pushed her, still
alive, from the trestle.32 Suspended in mid air after being shoved while
blindfolded must have been horrifying for this innocent woman, espe-
cially considering her fear of heights.
Whatever can be said about the comparative moral culpability of
seventeen year olds as a general matter, Simmons' actions unquestiona-
bly reflect a consciousness materially more depraved than that of the
22. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 817 (1988).
23. Id. at 815.
24. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1184.
25. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 820.
26. Id. at 859.
27. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1187.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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average murderer. Simmons's prediction that he could murder with im-
punity because he was younger than eighteen suggests that he did take
into account the punishment or the perceived risk of punishment in de-
ciding whether to commit the crime.
Based on this evidence, the sentencing jury certainly had reasonable
grounds for concluding that, despite Simmons' youth, he had sufficient
psychological maturity and demonstrated sufficient depravity when he
committed this horrific murder to merit a sentence of death. Yet, the
Justices comprising the plurality in Roper v. Simmons ignored these facts
and instead based their decision on general differences between juveniles
and adults.33 Such a reliance on generalities clearly violates their own
precedent which requires a sentencer to analyze all of the specific aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances of the individual offense.
The plurality in Roper v. Simmons made a bold statement that it dis-
trusts a jury's ability to determine with reliability which sixteen and sev-
enteen year olds are among the worst of the worst deserving of execu-
tion, when they had a prime example right in front of them.34
Consider some of the justifications for the plurality's ruling. They
found that a lack of maturity and an under-developed sense of responsi-
bility are found in youth more often than adults.3 5 Adolescents are over-
represented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior.36
Second, they found that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, such as peer pressure. 37 How-
ever, this is not true in every case, including Christopher Simmons'.
Lastly, they found that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as
that of an adult.3' They assert that personality traits of juveniles are more
transitory and less fixed.39 That may be true. However, there's no evi-
dence linking specific characteristics of teens' brains to any legally rele-
vant condition, such as impaired moral judgment or an inability to con-
trol murderous impulses. It is not logical to say we should excuse Chris-
topher Simmons because other juveniles' brains may not be fully devel-
oped, when that fact was never established in his case at the trial court
level. In fact, according to a prominent brain development researcher,
UCLA's Elizabeth Sowell, no current research connects specific brain
traits of typical teenagers to any mental or behavioral problems. 40 The
33. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195.
34. Id. at 1197.




39. Id. (citing to E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)).
40. Dudley Sharp, Why Some "Juvenile" Murderers Should Qualify For The Death Penalty:
Brain Science and Other Issues, at http://www.dpinfo.com/juveniles.htm (last visited June 26,
2005).
[Vol. 82:4
AN INNOCENT VICTIMS LIFE
hardest thing for neuroscientists to do is to try to bring brain research
into real-life context.
IV. GOALS OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Deterrence
The foundation of our judicial system is based on moral culpabil-
ity.4 1 The Court has consistently held that punishment be directly linked
to one's blameworthiness.42 In fact, causing harm intentionally must be
punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.
One of the rationales for imposing the death penalty - deterrence - is
linked to moral culpability, because it is based on the notion that a person
will not form the requisite intent to kill because of the threat of death.
The facts underlying Simmons is a prime example that the death
penalty did in fact serve as a deterrent. Christopher Simmons would not
have killed an innocent woman, if he knew he would have received the
ultimate penalty, indicated by his statement to friends that he could "get
away with it" because of his age.43 He considered the perceived risk of
punishment before he committed the crime and he fully understood the
consequences of his actions. In the end, Christopher Simmons was cor-
rect; he persuaded the Court to wrongfully assume that, magically, be-
cause of his age or inability to vote or lawfully drink, he does not possess
the requisite intent to merit the death penalty.4
According to Justice Scalia's dissent in Simmons, the fact that al-
most every state prohibits those who are under eighteen years of age
from voting, serving on juries or marrying without parental consent is
patently irrelevant and was an argument that was rejected in Stanford v
Kentucky. 
45
It is ... absurd to think that one must be mature enough to drive care-
fully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be ma-
ture enough to understand that murdering another human being is
profoundly wrong, and to conform one's conduct to that most mini-
mal of all civilized standards.4 6
Serving on a jury or entering into a marriage involve decisions far
more complicated than deciding to take a life.
41. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 528, 545 (1987).
42. Id.
43. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1187.
44. Id. at 1186.
45. Id. at 1224; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
46. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1224 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. Retribution
Another rationale, retribution, is only served by taking the lives of
those who, like Christopher Simmons, fully understand the consequences
of their actions, evaluate the risk of punishment, and make the conscious
decision to take another person's life. As a result of the ruling in Roper
v. Simmons, five Justices erroneously concluded that just because you are
one day younger than eighteen you are incapable of forming the requisite
intent to merit the death penalty.
Mr. Pena and Mr. Ertman, the fathers of the two victims described
above, have to live the rest of their lives knowing that their innocent
daughters' dignity was disrespected because their killers get to breathe
air as civilized human beings while their daughters were not given that
same opportunity. Similarly, Purdy Mitchell has to live the rest of her
life knowing that Christopher Simmons got away with taking the life of
her sister by committing a pre-meditated, cold-blooded murder despite
his knowledge of the consequences of his actions.
Victims like Mr. Pena, Mr. Ertman, and Purdy Mitchell will never
feel a sense of justice, because the Court in both Thompson and Simmons
based its decisions on an erroneous assumption about characteristics of
juveniles in general, while ignoring the moral culpability of both Thomp-
son and Simmons.
Whose dignity are we respecting by drawing a bright line rule at the
arbitrary age of eighteen that enables us to ignore the foundation upon
which this judicial system is based? The answer is clear once you under-
stand how Thompson and Simmons were decided.
The plurality in Roper v. Simmons erroneously concluded that there
was a national consensus against executing sixteen and seventeen year
olds by misconstruing Atkins v. Virginia.47 The plurality in Simmons
erroneously used Atkins to conclude that sixteen and seventeen year olds
are exempt from execution for several reasons.
For example, the Court concluded that the evidence against execut-
ing juveniles was similar to the evidence the Court relied on in Atkins to
exempt the mentally retarded from execution.48 In Atkins, thirty states
barred the death penalty for the mentally retarded, and even among those
states theoretically permitting such punishment, very few had carried out
execution of a mentally retarded person.49 In contrast, when Roper v.
47. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
48. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
49. Id.
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Simmons was decided, fifty percent of the states that expressly author-
ized juvenile executions administered it to seventeen year olds.
50
V. THE COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND CONSIDER INHERENT
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MENTALLY RETARDED INDIVIDUALS AND
JUVENILES IN REACHING ITS DECISION
The fact that the execution rate among juveniles has declined over
the past five years is inconclusive because the reasoning behind the sta-
tistic is unknown. The Court failed to recognize that juveniles who are
sixteen and seventeen years of age are substantially different than those
who are mentally retarded. In Atkins, the Court observed that mentally
retarded persons suffer from major competence and behavioral deficits,
sub-average intellectual functioning, and significant limitations in adap-
tive skills, such as communication, self-care, and self-direction, that be-
come manifest before the age of eighteen. 51 Because of their impair-
ments, they have diminished capacities to understand and process infor-
mation, to communicate, and to abstract from mistakes and learn from
their experiences 2 These impairments make the goals of the death pen-
alty nonexistent and also make capital punishment for the mentally re-
tarded a disproportionate one because of their inability to fully under-
stand and comprehend the consequences of their actions.53
These same impairments, however, simply do not exist among ju-
veniles who are sixteen and seventeen years of age. Some sixteen and
seventeen year olds are more mature and advanced than some eighteen
year olds. In fact, the plurality in Simmons acknowledged the fact that
some eighteen year olds achieve a maturity level that some adults never
achieve. 4 Similarly, sixteen and seventeen year olds are not as easily
manipulated into making confessions as the mentally retarded because
juveniles do not suffer from the same impairments.
VI. THE COURT'S USE OF THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
DOCTRINE AND NATIONAL CONSENSUS ANALYSIS IGNORES PRECEDENT,
THE RESPONDENT'S MORAL CULPABILITY, AND CONSTITUTES AN
ARBITRARY DECISION BASED UPON ASSUMPTIONS
In order to understand how the Court reached its conclusion in
Roper v. Simmons, we must analyze how it utilized this notion of stan-
dards of decency. The Court has decided that in determining whether the
50. Charles Lane, 5-4 Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile Executions, WASHINGTON POST,
March 2, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62584-
2005Marl .html.
51. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002).
52. Id. at 318.
53. Id. at 318-20.
54. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
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juvenile death penalty comports with contemporary standards of de-
cency, its inquiry must start with state legislation.
The way the Court looks at state legislation is inherently arbitrary
because it is inconsistent in determining which states to consider in its
analysis. For example, in Thompson and Stanford, the Court only
counted the number of states that explicitly set a minimum age prohibit-
ing a juvenile from execution because it reasoned that those were the
only states that considered juveniles in their determination.5 5 However,
the plurality in Roper v. Simmons included twelve states that did not ex-
plicitly set a minimum age prohibiting a juvenile for execution in its
analysis. 56 By doing so, it violated both Thompson and Stanford.
The reasoning in Roper v. Simmons for including the twelve states
makes an erroneous assumption about the decisions of legislatures. The
Court included twelve states in the analysis because it erroneously as-
sumed that those state legislatures decided that the death penalty is inap-
propriate for all offenders, including juveniles. 57 According to Justice
Scalia's dissent, the insinuation that the Court's new method of counting
contradicts only the Stanford court is misleading. 8 None of the cases
dealing with an alleged Constitutional limitation of the death penalty has
counted those states eliminating the death penalty entirely as supporting
a consensus in favor of that limitation.59 It sheds no light, whatever, on
the point at issue.
The fact that twelve states have eliminated execution entirely indi-
cates absolutely nothing about the consensus that offenders under the age
of eighteen deserve special immunity from such a penalty. In fact, in
repealing the death penalty, those twelve states considered none of the
same factors that the Court put forth as determinative of the issue before
it in Roper v. Simmons, which were: lower culpability of the young, in-
herent recklessness, and the lack of capacity for considered judgment.60
What might be relevant, perhaps, according to Justice Scalia, is how
many of those states permit sixteen and seventeen year old offenders to
be treated as adults with respect to non-capital offenses.6 ' They all do;
some even require juveniles as young as fourteen to be tried as adults if
they are charged with murder.62 According to Justice Scalia, "[t]he at-
tempt by the Court to turn its remarkable minority consensus into a faux
majority by counting Amishmen is an act of nomological desperation., 63
55. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 827; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
56. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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VII. THE COURT'S NATIONAL CONSENSUS ANALYSIS IS ARBITRARY
BECAUSE IT FAILED To ADOPT THE OBJECTIVE CRITERIA AND/OR
GUIDELINES THAT HAVE ARISEN OUT OF STATE LEGISLATION TO
RATIONALLY DECIDE How MANY STATES FORM A NATIONAL
CONSENSUS
Relying on the number of states to conclude whether or not a na-
tional consensus exists is inherently arbitrary in and of itself. For exam-
ple, in 1989, when Stanford was decided, the Court noted that twenty-
two of the thirty-seven death penalty states permitted the death penalty
for sixteen year old offenders. 64 Among those thirty-seven states, twenty-
five permitted it for seventeen year old offenders and twenty-two permit-
ted it for sixteen year old offenders.65 These numbers, in the Court's
view, indicated there was no national consensus sufficient to label a par-
ticular punishment cruel and unusual.66
When Simmons was decided, there were twenty states out of thirty-
eight that imposed the death penalty upon juveniles who are seventeen
years of age at the time they committed premeditated murder.67 More
than fifty percent of the states that addressed the issue authorized it.
Also, the Court failed to acknowledge the fact that no states could au-
thorize the execution of a fifteen year old after 1988, because Thompson
expressly prohibited a state from doing so by ruling that it was cruel and
unusual punishment.
68
In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court failed to draw a key
distinction between the execution of the mentally retarded in Atkins and
the execution of juveniles with respect to its national consensus analysis.
For instance, in Atkins, very few states actually executed the mentally
retarded. In fact, it was rare for a state to execute a mentally retarded
person even in the minority of states that authorized it.6 9 In contrast,
however, when Simmons was decided, twenty out of the thirty eight
states that had given express consideration to a minimum age for the
death penalty expressly authorized the execution of seventeen year
olds. 70 The only difference in the number of states that authorized exe-
cuting sixteen and seventeen year olds from 1989 to the time Simmons
was decided, is five states.71 Yet, the majority in Simmons found this to
be significant.72 It also found a recent trend toward cracking down on
juvenile crime to be of importance without clarifying or establishing its
64. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71.
65. Id. at 370.
66. Id. at 371.
67. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
68. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
69. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1193.
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relevance to whether executing a sixteen or seventeen year old consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishmcnt.
73
The majority's erroneous assumption about the decisions of legisla-
tures violates the reasoning in Thompson. In Thompson, the plurality
based its decision that a juvenile under the age of eighteen is exempt
from execution on the fact that no death penalty state that had given ex-
press consideration to a minimum age for the death penalty had set the
minimum age lower than sixteen.74 Yet, in Roper v. Simmons, the plural-
ity violates this reasoning by erroneously assuming and concluding that
among the twelve states that prohibit executions altogether, they all con-
sidered juveniles as part of the rule-making process.
75
Subjective determination of the Justices that ultimately determines
how many states form a national consensus contradicts the purposes be-
hind the evolving standards of decency doctrine the United States Su-
preme Court created. The evolving standards of decency doctrine was
adopted in 1910 by the United States Supreme Court to interpret what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the notion that signifi-
cant changes in societal mores over time may require us to re-evaluate a
prior decision.7 6 However, this is impossible now, considering that the
ruling in Roper v. Simmons, that anyone under the age of eighteen is ex-
empt from execution, is now federal law.
The country can't change the law once the Court makes its decision.
Further, the decision of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
was supposed to be determined by society as a whole through state legis-
lation, not by the Court becoming a sole arbiter of our nation's moral
standards.
77
Utilizing the evolving standards of decency doctrine enabled the
Court to contradict itself by considering certain evidence in one land-
mark case but not in another. In Thompson, the Court considered re-
spected professional organizations and the beliefs of other nations, in-
cluding Anglo-American heritage and the Western European community,
in its analysis. 78 Yet, in Stanford, eleven years later, the Court did not
consider such evidence. 79 However, in Roper v. Simmons, the plurality
did consider beliefs of other nations as confirmations for its conclusions
and to note that the United States is the only country in the world that
continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.80 Are
beliefs of other nations really relevant? Haven't we as citizens of the
73. Id.
74. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.
75. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
76. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
77. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
78 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
79. Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
80. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
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United States created our own laws and precedent? In fact, isn't it the
duty of the United States Supreme Court to uphold its own precedent to
create federal law?
In addition to utilizing beliefs of other nations, the plurality in Sim-
mons relied on general popularity of anticrime legislation and an unsub-
stantiated trend in cracking down on juvenile crime to substantiate a na-
tional consensus against executing sixteen and seventeen year olds.8'
Does the general popularity of anticrime legislation or some trend in
enforcing juvenile crime bear any relevance to whether executing sixteen
and seventeen year olds constitutes cruel and unusual punishment?
Never in the past has the Court considered such evidence in deciding
whether it is constitutional to execute juveniles.
Not only has the Court considered different evidence in landmark
cases concerning the execution of juveniles, it has also interpreted the
same evidence concerning the frequency of juvenile executions differ-
ently. For example, in Stanford, the Court found the fact that the actual
execution for crimes committed under the age of eighteen accounted for
only two percent of the total number of executions that occurred between
1642 and 1986 to be insignificant.82 Yet, eleven years earlier, the Court
in Thompson found it significant that no execution of anyone under the
age of sixteen had taken place since 1948, despite the prosecution having
tried thousands of murder cases. 83 However, recently, the Court in Sim-
mons found the infrequent practice of executing juveniles to be of impor-
tance.84 Nobody really knows why the practice of executing juveniles is
infrequent. What does that statement really mean anyway? What ex-
actly did the Court base its statement on that executing juveniles has be-
come infrequent? It would have been highly probative for the Court to
have ascertained whether executing juveniles has become more or less
frequent than when Stanford was decided.
The Court not only interpreted statistics regarding the frequency of
juvenile executions differently in landmark cases but also inconsistently
construed a juvenile's responsibility. For example, in Thompson, the
Court relied on a juvenile being less blameworthy than an adult because
he or she is "less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by
mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult."'85 Yet, in Stanford, the
Court disregarded the petitioner's argument that seventeen and eighteen
86year olds cannot be held fully responsible for their actions.
81. Id. at 1193.
82. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373-74.
83. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832.
84. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1185.
85. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
86. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78.
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The plurality in Simmons made its decision by ignoring the thresh-
old inquiry in determining whether a particular punishment complies
with the Eight Amendment: whether it is one of the "modes or acts of
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that
the Bill of Rights was adopted. As the United States Supreme Court
noted in prior cases, the evidence is clear that the Eighth Amendment
was not originally understood to prohibit capital punishment for sixteen
and seventeen year old offenders.
88
VIII. SOCIETY DEEMED RESPONDENT'S EXECUTION ACCEPTABLE AS
INDICATED BY THE RECENT TREND OF IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY
ON THOSE WHO MERELY APPRECIATE THE HIGH RISK OF DEATH BUT
DO NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF MURDER
The plurality in Simmons made an erroneous conclusion when it
stated "[p]etitioner cannot show national consensus in favor of capital
punishment for juveniles." 89 As was eloquently contained in large bold
print in the brief of amici curiae on behalf of Justice For All Alliance, a
societal national consensus exists authorizing Simmons's execution, as
evidenced by the recent trend of imposing the death penalty on those
who merely appreciate the high risk of death and do not actually commit
the act of murder. The United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia
specifically based its ruling of whether a national consensus exists pro-
hibiting execution of the mentally retarded on the notion that it is not so
much the number of states that is significant, but rather the consistency
of the direction of change. 90 The plurality in Roper v. Simmons should
have considered and acknowledged the fact that a societal national con-
sensus exists to impose the death penalty on one who did not kill nor
intend to kill but rather was a major participant in a felony murder.
91 The
rationale for this landmark decision in Tison v. Arizona is that actively
participating in a felony murder shows a reckless disregard for human
life, a highly culpable mental state meriting the death 
penalty.92
Intending to kill, taking into account the perceived punishment for
doing so, and following through with that intention, as Simmons did, is
an even higher culpable mental state than participating in an act that
shows a reckless disregard for human life. Therefore, society deems it
acceptable to execute Simmons, who committed a deliberate, premedi-
tated murder by taking an innocent woman out of her home, tying her up
hog-tied fashion, driving her to the end of a railroad trestle and pushing
her into a river down below.
87. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
88. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368.
89. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1194.
90. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
91. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
92. Id. at 157-58.
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It is deeply ingrained in our criminal justice system that intentional
harm must be punished more severely than unintentional harm.93 In Ti-
son, the petitioner did not specifically intend to kill the victim, nor did he
actually kill the victim. 94 In contrast, Christopher Simmons possessed
the specific intent to kill, and did in fact kill his victim. In Tison, the
petitioner was executed, therefore the respondent in the instant case
should have been executed.
CONCLUSION
The Court's reliance on a standard it created and labeled "the evolv-
ing standards of decency doctrine," is inherently arbitrary, violates
precedent and ignores the foundation upon which the judicial system is
based. It has no place in American jurisprudence. Instead of grouping
juveniles together as a class and drawing a bright line at the arbitrary age
of eighteen, the Court in Roper v. Simmons should have looked at juve-
niles individually and respected them as human beings with unique char-
acteristics, life experiences, personal responsibility and moral blamewor-
thiness. Like in Furman v. Georgia,95 the Court was urged to commit
error, and did so by concluding that anyone under the age of eighteen is
incapable of possessing the requisite mental state to merit the death pen-
alty.96 This is just not the case when we are dealing with sixteen and
seventeen year olds. In fact, it only disrespects sixteen and seventeen
year olds to characterize them as vicious animals rather than human be-
ings with a conscience and the ability to both know it is wrong to kill and
to conform their conduct to the most minimal standards of civilized soci-
ety.
It is a grave injustice, not only to the victim and the victim's family,
but also to society as a whole because the Court is able to disrespect the
victim and the victim's family by not basing its decision on the respon-
dent's moral culpability but rather on the Justices' individual perceptions
and biases. An issue of this magnitude should not be based on the gen-
eral characteristics of juveniles nor on whether the Justices decide to
include twelve states in its evolving standards of decency analysis.
Rather, it should be based on clear, objective criteria, which has evolved
out of state legislation and can carefully and adequately aid sentencers in
making a rational decision.
The United States Supreme Court had an obligation to provide the
states with the clearest guidance possible. It failed to do so when it based
its decision on the fact that it did not trust a jury to decide a murderer's
fate by weighing all of the mitigating and aggravating factors.97 Instead
93. Tison, 481 U.S. at 156.
94. Id. at 144.
95. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
96. Furman, 408 U.S. at 285-87.
97. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
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of undermining the very foundation of our capital sentencing system,
which entrusts juries to make difficult and uniquely human judgments
that deny codification and that build discretion, equity and flexibility into
a legal system, it should have embraced it. What does the Court's dis-
trust of jurors say about our judicial system as a whole? If the Justices
do not trust a jury to decide a juvenile's fate, then what prevents future
cases concerning other areas of law from reliance on the same rationale?
Why trust a jury to make any decisions regarding a defendant's mens rea
related to murder? Why have a jury system at all? As is evident, this
kind of mentality could inevitably lead to the end of our jury system al-
together.
It is surprising and unacceptable in a system that creates rules based
on precedent that the plurality of Roper v. Simmons failed to recognize or
acknowledge the fact that the Supreme Court of Missouri flagrantly vio-
lated precedent by ignoring Stanford v. Kentucky which authorized the
execution of sixteen and seventeen year olds.
98
The Supreme Court of Missouri was correct in its assumption that
the United States Supreme Court would arbitrarily rule in Simmons' fa-
vor. There is an inherent problem with our judicial system when an
issue of such magnitude concerning the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause under the Eighth Amendment is decided by people who are able
to make their decision publicly before the case is even in front of them.
In a society that relies on the judicial system to remedy wrongs and
achieve justice, it is very disturbing that we respect the dignity of one
who shows a conscious disregard for humanity by taking another's life,
after fully understanding, evaluating and intending the consequences.
Yet, at the same time, we flagrantly disrespect someone, like Jennifer
Ertman, a sixteen-year-old teenager, who risked her life in an attempt to
save her best friend's life, showing her respect for humanity and dignity.
The Court failed to uphold justice by not linking the ultimate punishment
to those who are morally culpable for having committed premeditated
murder like Christopher Simmons. In doing so, it neglected the only
sense of justice many families of victims feel after having their loved one
taken from them. The Court extended Christopher Simmons humanity
when he did not give that same respect to Shirley Crook. 99 He took
away her fundamental right to live, while knowing and intending the
consequences of deliberately pushing her off a railroad trestle into a river
far below.
The Court was ultimately responsible for making sure that states
chose the appropriate punishment for those who are morally culpable for
having committed premeditated murder making them among the worst of
98. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78.
99. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
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the worst. The Court failed this responsibility by sending a message to
sixteen and seventeen year olds that one can commit premeditated mur-
der without having to suffer the ultimate consequences. The sad reality
of Roper v. Simmons, as Justice Kennedy stated during oral argument,
may be that gang members use sixteen and seventeen year olds as hit
men to commit premeditated murder. The death penalty no longer serves
as a deterrent for juveniles who, like Simmons, are able to rationalize the
consequences of his or her actions before he or she decides to commit
premeditated murder. The possibility of deterring a sixteen or seventeen
year old from intentionally taking another's life and saving an innocent
victim no longer exists.

